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I. INTRODUCTION 
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You have asked for our legal opinion on the patentability of 
inventions claimed in U.S. patent applications 07 /716,831, filed June 21, 1991 
(the '831 application, or "'831"), 07 /837,195, filed September 25, 1992 ('"195"), 
and 07 /952,911, filed February 12, 1993 ('"911"), all filed in the name of Craig 
Venter and others and assigned to the National Institutes of Health "(NIH)." 
We understand that NIH has abandoned these patent applications 
and has no present intention of filing similar applications in the future, but 
that NIH remains interested in the patenting of human DNA sequences from 
a broader public policy perspective. We have therefore attempted to focus 
on issues that are likely to recur in other patent applications filed by other 
people and institutions involved in DNA sequencing rather than on 
questions that are peculiar to the facts of these particular applications. 
Nonetheless, we preface this opinion letter with the caution that the facts of 
each patent case are unique. We have before us for consideration only these 
three NIH filings, and we are not in a position to offer a definitive opinion 
on the patentability of other inventions that may be claimed by other parties 
and supported by different disclosures in different patent applications. 
The expertise we bring to this issue is legal rather than scientific. 
Many issues of patent law turn on the understanding of skilled practitioners 
working in the field of the invention. We have identified these issues 
throughout this letter. 
We begin with a brief description of the NIH patent applications and 
then turn to the patentability issues presented by these applications. In our 
view, the most significant of these issues concern the utility, nonobviousness, 
and disclosure requirements of the patent laws. 
II. THE NIH cDNA PATENT APPLICATIONS 
The three applications under review seek patent protection for 
inventions associated with the identification of approximately 6,800 partial 
cDNA sequences, called "expressed sequence tags" ("ESTs") in the 
applications, in the laboratory of Dr. Craig Venter at the National Institute 
of Neurological Disorders and Stroke prior to his departure from NIH in July 
1992. These sequences, which are typically 150-400 base pairs in length, 
were obtained by partially sequencing randomly selected clones from human 
brain cDNA libraries enriched by removing ribosomal and other common 
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sequences: The applications include many different claims, which for 
convenience we divide into the following groups: 
•Sequence claims (claims 1-3, 17-18, and 25-43 
in the '195 application, and 1-3 and 19-20 in 
the '911 application) 
•Full gene claims (claims 4-18 and 47-54 in the 
'195 application and 4-16 in the '911 
application) 
•Purified form claims (claims 19 in the '195 
application and 21 in the '911 application) 
•Construct claims (claims 20-21 in the '195 
application and 22-23 in the '911 application) 
•Panel claims (claim 22 in the '195 application 
and 24 in the '911 application) 
•Antisense claims (claims 23 in the '195 
application and 25 in the '911 application) 
•Triple helix claims (claims 24 in the '195 
application and 26 in the '911 application) 
The '831 application, which initially covered the first 315 ESTs as well 
as the method for obtaining them, was subsequently converted into a 
statutory invention registration covering only the method claims before 
being rejected by the patent examiner. We do not address the patentability 
of the method claims except insofar as it relates to the patentability of the 
other claims. The sequences of the '831 application are included in the 2,421 
sequences covered by the '195 application, which is a continuation-in-part of 
'831. The claims of '195 were finally rejected by the Patent and Trademark 
Office ("PTO") in August of 1993. The claims of the '911 application, 
covering an additional 4,448 sequences, were rejected by the PTO in a first 
office action in December of 1993. NIH abandoned all three applications in 
February of 1994. 
III. lJTILITY 
Perhaps the issue that has drawn the most attention in public 
discussions of the patentability of the NIH cDNA sequences is whether these 
sequences have patentable utility. 
4 AIPLAQ.J. 
A. Background And Applicable Law 
Vol. 23: 1 
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to provide patent 
protection for the express purpose of promoting progress in "the useful 
arts."1 In keeping with this language, the U.S. patent statute limits patent 
protection to "useful" inventions2 and requires patent applicants to disclose 
how to use their inventions. 3 The utility requirement has at least three 
interrelated dimensions to it, although the courts and the PTO are not 
always clear about which of these dimensions is at issue in a given case. 
First, an invention must serve a practical purpose.4 Second, it must be 
"operable," or capable of use.5 Third, the invention as claimed must be 
supported by a disclosure that is adequate to enable a skilled practitioner 
working in the field to use the invention with no more than routine 
experimentation. 6 
One source of difficulty in defining the content of the utility 
requirement is a lack of clarity as to its underlying purposes. In the early 
nineteenth century, Justice Story suggested that the standard of utility 
should be considered satisfied so long as an invention has some beneficial 
usfil and is not "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
morals of society."7 As long as the invention was not contrary to public 
morality and policy, Story saw no reason why the public should object to the 
patenting of an invention of very little utility: "If it be not extensively useful, 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 35 u.s.c. § 101 (1988). 
3 35 u.s.c. § 112 (1988). 
4 Anderson v. Natta, 480 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458 (C.C.P.A.) 
1973). See 1 w. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON TI-IE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS (1890). 
5 Newmann v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
1989). 
6 35 u.s.c. § 112 (1988). 
7 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). 
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it will silently sink into contempt and disregard."8 In this view the utility 
requirement merely serves to withhold patents on harmful inventions, and 
it is the function of the market to limit the value of patents on inventions of 
only minimal utility. 
This was probably the dominant view of the utility requirement in 
the United States through the middle of the twentieth century, except in the 
case of inventions claimed to have value in the treatment of human disease. 
Such inventions were subjected to a higher standard of proof of utility, 
particularly in the days before the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical 
products were separately monitored by the Food and Drug Administration, 
on the ground that issuance of a patent might mislead the public by 
appearing to represent a government imprimatur of the value of a so-called 
"patent medicine."9 Modem courts have explicitly disclaimed this higher 
standard of utility for pharmaceuticals, 10 yet the double standard seems to 
live on as a practical matter, as will become apparent from a review of the 
cases. 
The U.S. Supreme Court suggested a larger role for the utility 
requirement in Brenner v. Manson.11 The invention at issue in that case was 
a new process for making certain known steroids. The patent examiner 
rejected the claims on the ground that the applicant had failed to disclose 
any utility for the chemical compounds produced by the process. The Board 
of Appeals within the Patent Office affirmed the rejection, but the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, holding that an operative process for 
producing a known product satisfies the utility requirement so long as the 
product is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest. The Supreme 
Court reversed again in an opinion that raised at least as many questions as 
it answered about the utility requirement.12 
8 Id. 
9 Mahler v. Animarium Co., 111  F. 530, 537 (8th Cir. 1901). 
10 In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
11 383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966). 
12 Id. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696. 
6 AIPLAQ.J. Vol. 23: 1 
The Court explicitly rejected the view that the utility requirement is 
met by any invention that is not positively harmful to society.13 Nor was 
utility established by showing that the invention yields products that are 
currently the subject of serious scientific investigation.14 The court was 
particularly concerned that conferring patent rights in basic research 
discoveries could create "a monopoly of knowledge" and "confer power to 
block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating 
benefit to the public." 15 _ The court concluded that patent protection was 
premature until the invention had been refined and developed to the point 
where "specific benefit exists in currently available form." 16 The majority 
opinion closed with the following passage: "A patent is not a hunting 
license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful 
conclusion. 'A patent system must be related to the world of commerce 
rather than to the realm of philosophy . . .. "m One plausible reading of this 
opinion is that the utility requirement serves a timing function, leaving basic 
research discoveries in the public domain until they have yielded tangible 
benefits and have thereby left "the realm of philosophy" and entered "the 
world of commerce." 
Whether or not there was a meaningful distinction to be drawn 
between the realm of philosophy and the world of commerce in the field of 
steroid chemistry in the 1960s, it is a very difficult distinction to maintain in 
biotechnology in the 1990s, with researchers in government and university 
laboratories seeking patent protection for their discoveries and with private 
firms developing research tools for commercial sale. In this environment, 
research discoveries that are the subject of serious scientific investigation 
may be sold commercially to researchers long before they have ripened into 
products for sale to the general public. How far must an inventor go to 
establish that such an invention offers a "specific benefit ... in currently 
available form?" 
13 Id. at 533, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 695. 
14 Id. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696. 
15 Id. at 534, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 695. 
16 Id. at 534-35, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 695. 
17 Id. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 
965, 970, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 274, 279 (C.C.P.A. 1965)). 
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This question has been particularly difficult to answer for 
pharmaceutical inventions, which often involve separately discovered 
products and uses. Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit an.d its predecessor, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
have upheld the sufficiency of disclosures of pharmacological activity in vitro 
as establishing the practical utility of a novel compound.18 In Cross v. Iizuka, 
the Federal Circuit acknowledged that "in vitro testing is but an intermediate 
link in a screening chain which may eventually lead to the use of the drug 
as a therapeutic agent in humans," but nonetheless concluded that this link 
was sufficient to establish a practical utility for the compound, noting: 
"Successful in vitro testing will marshal resources and direct the expenditure 
of effort to further in vivo testing of the most potent compounds, thereby 
providing an immediate benefit to the public, analogous to the benefit 
provided by the showing of an in vivo utility."19 This suggests a more 
hospitable attitude toward the patenting of early stage pharmaceutical 
inventions than would be supported under a strict reading of Brenner v. 
Manson. 
However, in recent years biotechnology patent practitioners 
perceived an increasing strictness on the part of the PTO in its application of 
the utility requirement, particularly in the context of claims to methods of 
treatment or to pharmaceutical compositions. A series of decisions from the 
PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("the Board") reflects this 
trend,20 which may finally b.e coming to an end n1 light of very recent 
developments in the PTO and the Federal Circuit.21 
18 Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
19 Cross, 753 F.2d at 1051, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 748. 
20 See, e.g., Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702 (Bd. Pat. App. 
& Interf. 1992); Ex parte Aggarwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Interf. 1991); Ex parte Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Interf. 1991). 
21 These recent developments are the publication of new Utility 
Examination Guidelines by the PTO, PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 
60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995), and the decision of the Federal Circuit in In re 
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both 
discussed infra. 
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In Ex parte Balzarini,22 the Board affirmed a rejection for lack of utility 
of claims to pharmaceutical compositions in unit dosage form comprising 
one of two specified ingredients that had shown antiviral activity against 
HIV in vitro. The Board agreed with the examiner that those skilled in the 
art would regard the in vitro tests as a useful screening tool for selecting 
which compounds are appropriate candidates for further testing, but 
nonetheless held that the applicants had failed to satisfy their further burden 
of demonstrating that those skilled in the art would accept the in vitro test 
results as predictive of in vivo efficacy in treating humans who are HIV 
positive or suffering from AIDS. The Board was careful to note that it was 
not necessarily requiring clinical testing in humans to establish utility, 
although it could be that nothing short of human clinical trials would satisfy 
those skilled in this particular art that the claimed inventions would be 
effective in vivo.23 
In Ex parte Aggarwal,24 the Board affirmed the examiner's rejection of 
broad claims to a method of treatment of tumors in animals by administering 
a therapeutically effective amount of recombinantly produced lymphotoxin. 
The specification described preparation of recombinant lymphotoxin and 
demonstration of in vivo activity in mice as well as in vitro activity. The 
examiner took the position that given the unpredictability of the treatment 
of tumors at the time of the filing, the limited test data of record were 
insufficient to demonstrate utility across the broad range of the claims. In 
affirming, the Board conceded that "[t]here is no question that appellants 
have made an important discovery with regard to chemical compounds 
(proteins) which are the subject of serious scientific investigation but of 
unverified and speculative utility."25 The applicant argued unsuccessfully 
that the public interest called for allowing the filing of a patent application 
on such an invention early rather than waiting for what may be a long 
period of experimentation. According to the Board, in light of Brenner v. 
Manson and subsequent caselaw, such an application is premature until the 
applicant "can provide evidence showing substantial activity in screening 
22 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1892. 
23 Id. at 1897. 
24 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
25 Id. at 1339. 
1995 PA TENT ABILITY OF GENE FRAGMENTS 9 
tests customarily used and accepted as predicative [sic] of human activity for 
the type of chemical tested " and "commensurate with the scope of utility 
asserted and the subject matter claimed. " 26 
The Board took a similar approach in another case involving a 
method of treatment claim, Ex parte Sudilovsky.27 In that case the Board 
affirmed rejection for failure to demonstrate utility of claims to a method for 
inhibiting onset of or treating tardive dyskenesia, noting that the record 
indicated lack of predictability in the art and that the specification did not 
disclose experimental data or test results. 28 
Two recent developments may signal an end to the trend in the PTO 
toward increasingly restrictive applications of the utility requirement. First, 
the PTO has published new Utility Examination Guidelines admonishing 
examiners that a rejection for lack of utility is inappropriate if the applicant 
makes an assertion of utility that would be credible to a person of ordinary 
skill in the field or if the invention has a well-established utility. 29 An 
accompanying legal analysis prepared by the PTO affirms that inventions 
asserted to have utility in the treatment of human or animal disorders are 
subject to the same utility requirement as inventions in other fields of 
technology, and that "[O]ffice personnel should not construe§ 101, under the 
logic of 'practical' utility or otherwise, to require that an applicant 
demonstrate that a therapeutic agent based on a claimed invention is a safe 
or fully effective drug for humans . .. .  These general principles are equally 
applicable to situations where an applicant has claimed a process for treating 
a human or animal disorder. "30 These guidelines grew out of a PTO hearing 
in October 1994 on intellectual property issues of concern to the 
biotechnology industry, at which numerous witnesses complained that the 
PTO had been mishandling the utility requirement and inappropriately 
26 Id. 
27 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992). 
28 Id. at 1705. 
29 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995). 
30 Legal Analysis Supporting Utility Examination Guidelines, 50 Pat., 
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 297, 300 (Jul. 20, 1995) [hereinafter 
Utility Examination Guidelines]. 
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demanding from patent applicants the sort of proof of clinical efficacy that 
the FDA requires prior to approval of a new drug application.31 In 
announcing the proposed guidelines at a press conference, PTO 
Commissioner Bruce Lehman underscored his commitment to implementing 
the new guidelines through improved training of the examiners and 
supervisors and, if necessary, through changes in management practices or 
personnel. 32 
Second, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit very recently 
reversed a PTO decision rejecting claims to a new pharmaceutical invention 
for lack of utility in In re Brana, 33 chiding the PTO that the issue of what an 
applicant must prove to establish the utility of such an invention "is one 
which we would have thought had been settled by case law years ago."34 
The patent claims in that case were directed toward new chemical 
compounds for use as antitumor substances. The prior art revealed that 
structurally similar compounds had shown in vivo activity against implanted 
murine lymphocytic leukemias, and the specification reflected greater in vitro 
activity against human tumor cells for the claimed compounds than for the 
prior art compounds. The examiner concluded that these tests were 
insufficient to establish the utility of the claimed compounds, and the Board 
affirmed. 
The Federal Circuit reversed, indicating that the utility requirement 
was more than satisfied in this case. First, the court noted that disclosures 
of utility in the specification are presumptively correct unless manifestly 
based on implausible scientific principles, and that "treating cancer with 
chemical compounds does not suggest an inherently unbelievable 
31 See, e.g., Biotechnology Industry Organization, Critical Synergy: The 
Biotechnology Industry and Intellectual Property Protection, Presentations of 
the Intellectual Property Committee of the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization at the Hearing of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(October 17, 1994). 
32 PTO Announces New Biotechnology Guidelines, 49 Pat., Trademark and 
Copyright J. (BNA) 223, 224 (Jan. 5, 1995). 
33 51 F.3d 1560, 1562, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
34 Id. at 1564, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
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undertaking or involve implausible scientific principles." 35 The burden was 
initially on the PTO to provide evidence showing that someone of ordinary 
skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility. 36 The PTO had 
not met this burden, and thus the burden of proof did not shift back to the 
applicants for rebuttal. However, even if the burden had been shifted, the 
court was satisfied that the applicants had proferred sufficient rebuttal 
evidence to establish the utility of the compounds in the form of data 
showing significant antitumor activity in vivo in mouse models. 37 The court 
dismissed the PTO's argument that in vivo tests in animals are not 
sufficiently predictive of therapeutic efficacy in humans to establish utility 
with a sharp reminder to the PTO of its limited role in the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals: 
The Commissioner, as did the Board, confuses 
the requirements under the law for obtaining 
a patent with the requirements for obtaining 
government approval to market a particular 
drug for human consumption. . . . FDA 
approval . . . is not a prerequisite for finding 
a compound useful within the meaning of the 
patent laws . . . .  Usefulness in patent law, and 
in particular in the context of pharmaceutical 
inventions, necessarily includes the 
expectation of further research and 
development. . . .  Were we to require Phase II 
testing in order to prove utility, the associated 
costs would prevent many companies from 
obtaining patent protection on promising new 
inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive 
to pursue, through research and 
development, potential cures in many crucial 
areas such as the treatment of cancer. 38 
35 Id. at 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citing In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 
1322, 1327, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 885, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1567, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42. 
38 Id. at 1567, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442-43. 
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The latest word from both the Federal Circuit and the PTO thus suggests 
that the utility standard for biotechnology inventions may be receding from 
its recent high-water mark. 
Although proof of clinical efficacy may no longer be required to 
establish patentable utility, it bears emphasis that both the PTO and the 
Federal Circuit continue to require that, at least in cases where the invention 
does not have a well-established utility, the utility of a claimed invention be 
specifically identified in the patent application. Thus in its Legal Analysis 
Supporting Utility Examination Guidelines, the PTO observes that "a statement 
that a composition has an unspecified 'biological activity' or that does not 
explain why a composition with that activity is believed to be useful fails to 
set forth a 'specific assertion of utility."'39 And in In re Brana the Federal 
Circuit conceded that the PTO's argument that the application failed to 
disclose a specific disease that could be treated with the claimed compounds, 
thereby requiring undue experimentation before the invention could be put 
to use, was "not without merit."40 In the end, however, the court was 
satisfied that comparisons made in the application between the effectiveness 
of the claimed compounds and prior art compounds implicitly asserted that 
the claimed compounds were useful against lymphocytic leukemia. 
Another recent decision of the Federal Circuit, in a case not involving 
a pharmaceutical product, affirms that the utility requirement still operates 
to withhold patent protection from inventions that are too far removed from 
practical applications.41 In re Ziegler involved an appeal from a rejection of 
a U.S. patent application claiming priority in the discovery of polypropylene 
on the basis of a German patent application filed in 1954.42 The examiner 
rejected the claims at issue in part on the ground that the German 
39 Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 30, at 302. 
40 Brana, 51 F.3d at 1565, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440. 
41 In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
42 A U.S. patent application filed within one year of a foreign patent 
application is treated as if it had been filed on the foreign filing date for 
purposes of determining what counts as prior art, provided the foreign 
application satisfies the disclosure requirements of U.S. law. 35 U.S.C. § 
119 (1994); Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158 
(C.C.P.A. 1973). 
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application failed to disclose a practical utility for polypropylene. That 
application disclosed that polypropylene is "plastic-like" and that it may be 
pressed into a flexible film with a characteristic infrared spectrum. A 
previous court in another proceeding had rejected Ziegler's argument that 
the disclosure that polypropylene is "plastic-like" established its utility, and 
Ziegler was therefore precluded from relitigating this issue.43 Thus the only 
remaining question was whether the disclosure that polypropylene is solid 
and that it may be pressed into a flexible film with a characteristic infrared 
spectrum was sufficient to establish a practical utility for the material. In 
affirming the PTO's determination that it did, the Federal Circuit echoed the 
concerns over premature filings expressed by the Supreme Court in Brenner 
v. Manson:44 "We are convinced that, at best, Ziegler was on the way to 
discovering a practical utility for polypropylene at the time of the filing of 
the German application; but in that application Ziegler had not yet gotten 
there."45 The court concluded: "While we are cognizant of Ziegler's 
noteworthy contributions to polymer chemistry, we must nevertheless abide 
by the principle underlying 35 U.S.C. § 101 that a patent 'is not a reward for 
the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."'46 
Under the standards set by these cases, the inventions claimed in the 
NIH patent applications may well lack patentable utility, although the issue 
is not entirely free from doubt. We tum to the specific facts of the Venter 
applications. 
B. Utility Of The NIH Inventions 
Plainly, these applications were drafted with the possibility of a 
utility rejection in mind. The specifications are replete with imaginative 
suggestions for how to use the claimed sequences, individually or in panels, 
many of which are set forth in prophetic (untested) examples. The 
specification recites that ESTs may be used as probes to isolate coding 
sequences and complete genes, which may then be mapped to chromosomal 
locations. They may be used as chromosome markers. Complete genes, 
43 Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1201, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
44 383 U.S. 519, 535, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 696 (1966). 
45 Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1203, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
46 Id. (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696). 
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isolated through use of the EST probes, may be expressed in recombinant 
host cells to obtain their protein or polypeptide products. ESTs, or other 
sequences obtained through the use of ESTs, may be used as diagnostic 
probes, to deted the presence of a specific rnRNA in a particular cell type, or 
in genetic linkage analysis, or to locate gene regions associated with genetic 
disease. ESTs may be used to regulate gene expression through triple helix 
formation or antisense methods. Panels of ESTs may be used for individual 
identification for forensic and other purposes, a use for which the estimated 
eighty-five percent of the ESTs that appear to come from noncoding regions 
are said to be particularly well suited because polymorphisms are more 
common in noncoding regions. Panels of ESTs specific to particular tissue 
types may also be used as reagents to identify tissue specimens by organ 
type or by species. 
It is only necessary to show one practical utility for an invention in 
order to patent it.47 Thus if any one of the utilities recited in the Venter 
applications amounts to a practical utility and is supported by an enabling 
disclosure, the sequences or panels of sequences that are shown in the 
specification to have this utility will pass the utility test. Moreover, the 
patent rights that could be obtained on the basis of such a disclosure of 
practical utility would not be limited to use of the sequences for the 
disclosed purposes, but would potentially extend to all uses of the 
sequences. 
The patent examiner was unimpressed by the suggested utilities, and 
rejected the '195 appplication for lack of utility, among other grounds, in an 
Office Action dated August 20, 1992: 
The mere mention of general possible uses is 
not sufficient to establish a definite utility 
because the instant application does not 
disclose a patentable utility for the 
oligonucleotides or other nucleotides of the 
claimed inventions in their currently available 
form. Given what is disclosed in the instant 
application, it would be necessary for one to 
do further work in order to establish a utility 
for many of the nucleotides embraced by the 
47 35 u.s.c. § 101 (1994). 
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claims. The instant application does not teach 
one of skill in the art the significance of any 
putative result of any of the tests or processes 
alluded to in the application. Although the 
oligonucleotides embraced by the claims may 
be hybridized to a variety of different 
preparations of other nucleic acids, one of 
skill in the art has no clue as to the 
significance of any results of such 
hybridization because the instant application 
fails to provide any basis for the 
interpretation of any putative results. Thus, 
given the invention in its currently available 
form, others would be compelled to 
experiment, interpret results, and invent a 
patentable utility for the claimed nucleotides. 
15 
In other words, the recited utilities were inadequate because a skilled person 
reading the specification would have to engage in further undue 
experimentation in order to put the claimed inventions to the suggested 
uses. 
As noted above, in order to satisfy the utility requirement, a patent 
applicant must not only disclose a specific, practical use for the claimed 
invention but must also provide a disclosure that enables others working in 
the same field to use the invention in the described manner without having 
to do more than routine experimentation. Whether this enablement 
dimension of the utility requirement has been satisfied as to the recited 
utilities depends on the state of knowledge in the field at the time of filing 
and the level of skill among ordinary practitioners working in the field.48 
Working examples in the specification may help in satisfying this 
requirement, particularly if they indicate that the applicant has successfully 
put the invention to the recited uses. Prophetic examples that describe how 
to do something the applicants have not yet done in their own laboratories 
are less probative of enablement, but they may be sufficient if there is no 
reason to doubt that the instructions are adequate to make the invention 
48 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495-96, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1444 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991); In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1161, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 209, 215 
(C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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operable for the described use without undue experimentation.49 On the 
other hand, if a person with ordinary skill in the field would question the 
validity of the applicants' assertions of utility, the burden of proof shifts to 
the applicants to demonstrate their truth.50 
Application of these principles is highly specific to the facts of 
particular cases. The requirement is harder to satisfy without actual data 
showing success in the laboratory in fields that exhibit greater 
unpredictability in experimental outcomes. Thus, patent examiners are 
typically more skeptical of asserted utilities based on prophetic examples for 
chemical inventions than for mechanical inventions. Examiners have shown 
particular skepticism toward unproven utilities for drugs and therapeutic 
inventions, although this attitude may be changing in light of the recent 
developments discussed above. 
Returning to the Venter application with these general principles in 
mind, the disclosed utilities that are most vulnerable to challenge are those 
that either (1) do not indicate a specific purpose for which the inventions 
may be used, or (2) depend for their operability on the success of 
experiments that have not been performed and are not certain to work in the 
minds of other practitioners of ordinary skill in the field. The former 
category would seem to include the claimed utilities as diagnostic probes in 
genetic linkage analysis, as probes to locate gene regions associated with 
genetic disease, for regulation of gene expression through antisense and 
triple helix methods, and for differentiating tissue types. Even if these 
asserted utilities no longer trigger the heightened skepticism as to 
operability and enablement recently applied by the PTO to pharmaceutical 
and therapeutic inventions, they remain vulnerable to challenge on the 
ground that undue experimentation would be necessary in order to 
determine which if any diagnostic or therapeutic purposes any of the ESTs 
might serve. Yet each of these utilities is described in broad, general terms 
and in purely prophetic examples, unsupported by specific experimental 
49 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont Nemours, 750 F.2d 1569, 1577, 224 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1775 (D. Mass. 1989). 
50 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1441 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995); In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 433, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 51 
(C. C.P.A. 1981). 
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data that would identify the significance of any particular sequence to any 
particular disease. 
We lack the technical expertise to evaluate which of the remaining 
utilities would be met with skepticism by skilled persons in the field or 
would require undue experimentation to carry out. Uses of the disclosed 
sequences as probes for diagnosing disease gene regions or to control gene 
expression through triple helix formation or DNA or RNA antisense 
molecules seem particularly vulnerable to challenge on this basis. Each of 
these utilities seems to require a subsequent research effort that appears 
fraught with uncertainty on the basis of the limited information provided in 
the specification and the state of the art. 
The asserted utility of panels of sequences for tissue typing or for 
forensic identification purposes may also be vulnerable on this ground. The 
utility of the sequences in tissue typing depends on the sequences being 
variably expressed in different types of tissue. The specification states that 
subtractive hybridization was used to selectively remove sequences shared 
by a cDNA library from a human lung fibroblast cell line, but it does not 
indicate which of the remaining sequences is unique to brain tissue. 
Similarly, the utility of the sequences for forensic identification purposes 
depends on their being polymorphic. The specification states that eighty­
five percent of the sequences appear to come from noncoding regions and 
that polymorphisms are particularly common in noncoding regions, but it 
does not indicate which, if any, of the sequences is in fact polymorphic. 
Perhaps these difficulties can be overcome by using panels that are so large 
that the likelihood of variable expression by tissue type or polymorphisms 
across individuals becomes overwhelming. But in that case the asserted 
utilities would only seem to support the patentability of these large panels, 
and not of smaller panels or of individual sequences. 
A related problem is that the disclosure gives only limited guidance 
as to which of the sequences (or which combinations of sequences) are 
suitable for which of these uses. The process of selection may itself involve 
undue experimentation. As Examiner Martinell stated in reference to the 
panel claims, "[T]he panel of oligonucleotides in claim 22 has no patentable 
utility because the instant application fails to disclose a single such panel out 
of the astronomical number of such panels possible and disclose any use for 
such a putative panel in its currently available form." Moreover, even if the 
disclosure is fully enabling as to how to select appropriate sequences or 
panels, the disclosed utilities will only support the patentability of those 
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sequences or panels that are useful for those purposes and not the others. 
To the extent that the disclosed utilities work only for some of the sequences 
or only for some panels of sequences, the claims are overly broad. 
Of all the asserted utilities for the ESTs, the most credibly operable 
and enabled are the use as probes to obtain full cDNA sequences and the use 
as chromosome markers. Although only a small handful of cDNAs 
corresponding to ESTs had actually been fully sequenced as of the filing 
date, the same procedure could be readily followed by other skilled persons 
in the field if they were motivated to do so. Similarly, although only a small 
fraction of the ESTs had actually been mapped to chromosomes as of the 
filing date, mapping the others according to the methods disclosed in the 
specification may involve no more than routine experimentation.51 But these 
uses may be particularly vulnerable to challenge under Brenner v. Manson as 
representing utility only as an object of study in subsequent research rather 
than showing "specific benefit ... in currently available form." 
Use of the ESTs as probes to obtain full cDNA sequences has no 
practical benefit unless and until the full sequences themselves may be used 
for some purpose beyond research. Subsequent research may well prove 
some of the genes useful for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, but the 
information disclosed in the specification fails to identify which of the genes 
will be useful, or for which purposes. Practical utility of the sequences 
awaits determination of the function of the genes they are associated with, 
thus implicating the concern for premature filing underlying the decisions 
in Brenner v. Manson52 and In re Ziegler.53 
This concern with premature filing seems particularly on target in 
this context because it parallels the reactions of scientists to the NIH filings. 
Scientists quoted in the popular and scientific press repeatedly expressed an 
51 Examiner Martinell assumed otherwise in his second office action dated 
August 10, 1993, in which he noted that a DNA sequence covered by the 
claims may hybridize to more than one chromosome. If this is correct, 
then the disclosure is inadequate to enable use of the sequences for 
mapping and the utility of the sequences has not been established on this 
basis. 
52 383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966). 
53 992 F.2d 1197, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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intuition that NIH was claiming too much in light of the very preliminary 
information that they had disclosed. 54 It seems likely that the PTO and the 
courts might have a similar reaction, and that a utility rejection would 
present an appealing doctrinal basis for expressing that view. 
Use of the ESTs as markers presents a closer question. Assuming 
that the disclosure is sufficiently enabling to allow the sequences to be 
mapped, the mapped sequences may be useful as markers right away 
without waiting to learn what genes they come from or the functions of 
those genes. Such markers are sold commercially, albeit to researchers. 
Does the existence of a commercial market among researchers confer 
patentable utility on research reagents? Existing caselaw does not 
unambiguously resolve this question, and policy arguments could be made 
on either side of the issue. One could argue that research tools are like the 
process for making the steroid at issue in Brenner v. Manson55-merely a 
means for facilitating subsequent research and not yet offering any "specific 
benefit ...  in currently available form." Moreover, there are reasons to be 
wary of patents on research tools, including concerns that they might be 
licensed on an exclusive basis to the detriment of subsequent research.56 On 
the other hand, genetics research is big business, and private firms are 
playing a growing role in generating tools for the use of genetics researchers 
in the public and private sectors. Withholding patent protection from 
research tools could undermine incentives to develop such tools in the 
private sector and to make them available to researchers. In the absence of 
patent protection, a public institution such as NIH will presumably place its 
research tools in the public domain; the same cannot necessarily be expected 
of the private firms whose sequencing efforts in recent years have far 
outpaced those of NIH. Under these circumstances, it is not clear whether 
54 See e.g., Robin Herman, The Great Gold Rush: U.S. Rankles Other Countries 
With Preemptive Strike in the Race to Patent Human Genes, WASHINGTON 
POST, June 16, 1992, at Zl 1; Earl Lane, Debate Over Gene Patent Application; 
Scientists Argue NIH's Claim Will Choke a Free Flow of Data, NEWSDAY, May 
19, 1992, at 55. 
55 383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966). 
56 For an expanded discussion of this issue focussing on the controversy 
over these particular patent applications, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research 
Tools, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 163 (1994). 
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a strong view of the utility requirement for DNA sequences or other research 
tools would on balance promote subsequent research or retard it. 
In sum, although the utility issues raised by these patent applications 
have no clear answers, in light of recent caselaw it is not surprising that the 
PTO rejected the claims of the '195 application for lack of utility, nor would 
we be surprised to see the Federal Circuit affirm the rejection on this ground. 
The primary reasons for this reaction are: (1) many of the asserted utilities 
involve use for vaguely identified diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, with 
no indication of the particular diagnostic or therapeutic purposes for which 
any particular sequence or group of sequences might be used; (2) most of the 
sequences may not be put to the asserted uses without further 
experimentation which appears to go beyond routine experimentation, and 
the outcome of which is uncertain; and (3) the utilities that appear least 
problematic on enablement and operability grounds-use of the sequences 
as probes for finding full-length cDNAs or as chromosome markers-are 
most vulnerable to challenge on the ground that they are merely of interest 
to researchers and don't yet amount to practical utility in currently available 
form. 
IV. NOVELTY 
Two fundamental requirements for patent protection are that the 
invention be new and that it be nonobvious.57 Both of these requirements 
were invoked by the examiner in rejecting the '195 and '911 applications. 
A. Background And Applicable Law 
An invention is new if it does not exist in the prior art (i.e., if it has 
not been disclosed in prior patents or publications and was not known or 
used by others).58 The novelty requirement is technical in that the claimed 
invention must be identically disclosed in a single prior art reference in order 
to be unpatentable.59 Thus patent lawyers who have the relevant prior art 
references before them may often avoid novelty rejections by tinkering with 
57 35 u.s.c. §§ 102, 103 (1994). 
58 35 u.s.c. § 102 (1994). 
59 RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 221 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228 (1984). 
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the claim language to avoid covering subject matter that has been disclosed 
in the prior art. 
On the other hand, the novelty standard is at the same time quite 
exacting, particularly for broadly worded claims, in the following sense: If 
a prior art reference discloses something that falls within the scope of a 
claim, the entire claim is invalid, even though much of what the claim covers 
has not been disclosed in the prior art, and even if the applicant's disclosure 
makes a significant contribution to the art that was beyond the 
contemplation of those familiar with the prior art. For example, if a patent 
is issued with a generic claim covering what is believed to be a new class of 
chemicals, and it is subsequently discovered that a chemical previously in 
use by others for an unrelated purpose belongs in that class and is therefore 
covered by the claim, the claim is invalid in its entirety. 
B. Novelty Of The NIH Inventions 
Because the novelty of a claimed invention is defeated by finding in 
the prior art a single embodiment falling within the scope of the claim 
language, it can be treacherous for broadly-worded claims, particularly if the 
subject matter covered by the claims cannot be readily identified, and the 
prior art can therefore not be searched effectively. Consider, for example, 
the August 20, 1992 rejection of the '195 application, which included a 
rejection for lack of novelty of claims that, as initially drafted, covered 
portions of the dis<;_losed sequences that were at least fifteen nucleotides in 
length. Among the prior art references cited by the examiner was a 
Pharmacia P-L Biochemicals 1984 Product Reference Guide. This catalog 
listed among the commercial reagents for sale two oligodeoxynucleotides, 
oligo(dA) and oligo(dT), consisting of chains of repeated A and T 
nucleotides, respectively. These commercially available sequences were 
sufficient to defeat the novelty of the original broadly-worded claims 
because some of the sequences disclosed in the specification included at least 
one run of fifteen or more A or T nucleotides, and because the claim 
language was drafted to cover portions of the sequences of at least fifteen 
nucleotides. NIH responded to this particular rejection by narrowing the 
claims to cover only fragments of at least 150 nucleotides, but even the 
amended claims might be subject to a similar challenge. 
Those claims that cover undisclosed gene fragments may be 
particularly vulnerable to challenge on this basis at a later date because there 
is no way of searching the prior art at present to determine whether it 
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discloses sequences covered by these claims. For example, claim 17 of the 
'195 application covers polynucleotide fragments at least 150 base pairs in 
length from any gene corresponding to any of the disclosed ESTs. Such a 
fragment could be from a remote region of the gene and have a DNA 
sequence that is completely dissimilar to anything disclosed in the 
specification. Since there is no way at present to determine what all of these 
sequences are, one cannot search the prior art to determine whether the 
claims are valid. A claim that does not define the invention with sufficient 
clarity to allow a proper search of the prior art may be invalid for lack of 
definiteness of the claim language, as discussed more fully below.6() But even 
if a patent were to issue on such a claim, the claim could later be challenged 
on the basis of prior art existing at the time of the filing that becomes salient 
at a later date when it is realized that one of the ESTs corresponded to a gene 
that had previously been fully or partially sequenced. If any sequence 
covered by the claims may be found anywhere in the prior art, any claim 
covering that sequence would be invalid in its entirety. 
While we are not in a position to offer a definitive opinion on the 
novelty of the claimed sequences, it is worth noting that the examiner also 
has not conducted an exhaustive search of the sequences embraced by the 
claims. Instead, the examiner searched the prior art for matches to 15-mer 
regions from a small number of the disclosed ESTs. The examiner noted that 
an exhaustive search of all possible 15-mer regions in just the 2,421 
sequences disclosed in '91 1  would have taken until the year 2035 to 
complete. It is not clear to us why the examiner was unable to search public 
sequence databases for exact matches to any 15-mer region from any of the 
disclosed sequences in the time available to him, but given that he did not 
conduct such a search, it is possible that the prior art includes exact matches 
to fragments even of the disclosed sequences that did not come to his 
attention. The potential for overlooking pertinent prior art is magnified 
when one considers the possibility that undisclosed (and therefore 
unsearchable) sequences covered by the claims might also exist in the prior 
art. The broader the claims, the more likely they are to lack novelty. 
V. NONOBVIOUSNESS 
Whereas the novelty requirement asks whether a claimed invention 
is identically disclosed in the prior art, the nonobviousness requirement asks 
60 See infra Part VI. C. 
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whether the invention represents a big enough technical advance to merit a 
patent. 
A. Background And Applicable Law 
A new and useful invention that someone of ordinary skill in the 
field would consider obvious in light of the prior art may not be patented.6 1 
Whether an invention satisfies this standard depends on (1) the scope and 
content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill among practitioners in 
the field of the invention; and (3) the differences between the invention and 
the prior art.62 This determination turns on evaluation of technical facts that 
are beyond our ken. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated 
that determinations of obviousness are ultimately legal judgments,63 and so 
we turn to the relevant case law. 
We begin by noting that existing case law leaves some uncertainty as 
to the proper analytical approach to take in determining the obviousness of 
a novel DNA sequence. A major source of confusion is a lack of clarity in the 
cases as to whether the requisite nonobviousness is to be found in the 
method of obtaining the sequence or in the sequence itself. Section 103 of the 
Patent Act recites that "[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner 
in which the invention was made."64 This inartful language is generally 
understood to mean that an invention may be patentable even if it was 
arrived at through tedious but routine experimentation rather than through 
ingenious insight.65 As long as the end result is nonobvious, the path by 
which the inventor got there should not defeat patentability. This principle 
has been particularly important in the chemical arts, where methods for 
synthesizing new chemicals are often obvious to practitioners of ordinary 
skill. Such new compounds may be deemed prirna fade obvious if they are 
61 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 11, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 464 (1966) 
(citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851)). 
62 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); id. at 11, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 464. 
63 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1214 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
64 35 u.s.c. § 103 (1994). 
65 Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474 n.7. 
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structurally similar to known compounds, but a patent applicant may 
nonetheless rebut the case of prima fade obviousness by showing that the 
compounds possess new and unexpected properties not present or 
suggested in the prior art.66 The focus is on the product and its properties 
rather than on the method of making the product. 
On the other hand, some cases have upheld the patentability of 
obviously desrrable products on the basis of evidence that inventive skill was 
required to figure out how to make them,67 although arguably if the 
inventiveness resides in the method of making the product rather than in the 
product itself only the method should be patentable. 
Some early cases addressing the patentability of DNA sequences 
focussed on the obviousness of the method used to isolate the sequence 
rather than attempting to address separately the obviousness of the sequence 
itself. For example, in Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,68 a defendant 
in an infringement action challenged the validity of a patent claiming a 
purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin 
("EPO") and host cells transformed with such a sequence. The district court 
rejected this challenge on the basis of its finding that the probing and 
screening methods used by the inventor to isolate the gene were nonobvious. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, but suggested in a footnote that it was not clear 
whether the analytical approach to this issue taken by the parties and the 
district court was correct: 
We note that both the district court and the 
parties have focused on the obviousness of a 
66 In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 691, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
67 E.g., In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (C.C.P.A. 
1969) (applicant who invented a "float glass" process for making sheet 
glass that was free of imperfections was entitled to claim the product itself 
in a product-by-process claim and should not be limited to obtaining 
process claims); Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097, 162 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 580 (2d Cir. 1969) (patent on an artificial filament adapted 
for use as brush bristles was valid where the means of making such a 
product was nonobvious), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970). 
68 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., 
Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991). 
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process for making the EPO gene, despite the 
fact that it is products (genes and host cells) 
that are claimed in the patent, not processes. 
We have directed our attention accordingly, 
and do not consider independently whether 
the products would have been obvious aside 
from the alleged obviousness of a method of 
making them. 69 
25 
Two years later, the court appeared to focus more on the structure of 
a DNA sequence than on the method of obtaining it in reversing a 
determination of obviousness in the case of In re Bell.70 The claimed 
inventions in that case were DNA and RNA molecules encoding human 
insulin-like growth factors I and II ("IGFs"). The Board concluded that prior 
art disclosing the amino acid sequences for the proteins and a general 
method for isolating genes for which a portion of the amino acid sequence 
is known by preparing nucleotide probes was enough to make the entire 
nucleotide sequence prima fade obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed in an 
opinion that stressed the unpredictability of the structure of the DNA 
sequence arising from the degeneracy of the genetic code: 
It may be true that, knowing the structure of 
the protein, one can use the genetic code to 
hypothesize possible structures for the 
corresponding gene and that one thus has the 
potential for obtaining that gene. However, 
because of the degeneracy of the genetic code, 
there are a vast number of nucleotide 
sequences that might code for a specific 
protein. In the case of IGF, Bell has argued 
without contradiction that the [amino acid 
sequences disclosed in the prior art] could be 
coded for by more than 1036 different 
nucleotide sequences, only a few of which are 
the human sequences that Bell now claims. 
Therefore, given the nearly infinite number of 
69 Id. at 1207 n.3, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031 n.3. 
70 991 F.2d 781, 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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possibilities suggested by the prior �rt, and 
the failure of the cited prior art to suggest 
which of those possibilities is the human 
sequence, the claimed sequences would not 
have been obvious.71 
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Although this language suggests a very generous attitude toward the 
nonobviousness of DNA sequences, the court went on to note several facts 
present in that case that could limit its precedential value in other cases. 
First, the court noted that Bell's sequence claims were narrow: 
Bell does not claim all of the 1036 nucleic acids 
that might potentially code for IGF. Neither 
does Bell claim all nucleic acids coding for a 
protein having the biological activity of IGF. 
Rather, Bell claims only the human nucleic 
acid sequences coding for IGF. Absent 
anything in the cited prior art suggesting 
which of the 1036 possible sequences 
suggested by [the prior art] corresponds to 
the IGF gene, the PTO has not met its burden 
of establishing that the prior art would have 
suggested the claimed sequences.72 
71 Id. at 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. One Board case also arguably 
takes a structural approach to determining the obviousness of a claimed 
DNA sequence. Fiddes v. Baird, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Bd. Pat. App. 
& Interf. 1993). In that case, the Board stressed structural differences 
between the prior art DNA sequence for mammalian and bovine basic 
fibroblast growth factors (FGFs) and the claimed DNA sequence encoding 
human basic FGF, rather than processes for obtaining the target genes, in 
concluding that the claimed sequences were not rendered obvious by the 
prior art. But that case had somewhat idiosyncratic facts, including that 
the Board elsewhere had held the prior art patent to be nonenabling, thus 
making it difficult to generalize from its holding. Moreover, the Board 
cited the process-focussed nonobviousness holding in Amgen in support 
of its decision, making it unclear whether it was the nonobviousness of the 
structure of the sequence . or the nonobviousness of the method of 
obtaining the sequence (or both) that provided the basis for the decision. 
72 Bell, 991 F.2d at 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
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This left open the possibility that broadly worded claims to a DNA sequence 
encoding a protein with a known amino acid sequence might be rejected as 
obvious. The basis for the distinction would be that the prior art might make 
obvious a DNA sequence encoding the protein, but not the particular 
sequence covered by the claim. 73 
Second, in In re Bell74 the Federal Circuit interpreted the prior art cited 
by the examiner as discouraging or "teaching away from" a successful 
method for finding the target gene because the disclosed method suggested 
designing a probe based on an amino acid sequence specified by unique 
codons. This approach would not have worked for finding the IGF genes, 
because one of them had only a single amino acid with a unique codon and 
the other had none. The salience of these facts to the court is inconsistent 
with its apparent focus earlier in the same opinion on structure rather than 
on the method of obtaining the gene and suggests that it might have reached 
a different decision if prior art had been cited that suggested a broader range 
of probing strategies. 
The Board distinguished in re Bell on this latter basis in Ex parte 
Deuel.75 In that case the prior art disclosed a partial amino acid sequence for 
heparin binding growth factors ("HBGFs") and general cloning methods. In 
holding that this was sufficient to make the gene prima facie obvious, th.e 
Board distinguished Bell on the ground that in that case the prior art taught 
away from a viable process for cloning the gene, while in Deuel the 
applicants did not challenge the examiner's assertion that the probing 
procedure set forth in the prior art would have allowed isolation of the gene 
73 The Board distinguished Bell in part on this basis in Ex parte Movva, 31 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993). In that case, the 
Board affirmed rejection of claims to DNA sequences and recombinant 
DNA molecules encoding swine growth hormone or polypeptides 
displaying the biological activity of swine growth hormone where the 
claims were drafted to include degenerate sequences encoding the same 
protein. "If the reasonable expectation of success found to be lacking in Bell 
can be analogized to the likelihood of hitting the center of the bulls-eye on 
a dart board, the present reasonable expectation of success would be more 
akin to merely hitting any spot on the dart board." Id. at 1034. 
74 991 F.2d at 785, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. 
75 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1449 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993), rev'd sub 
nom; In re Deuel, 31 F.2d 1552, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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without undue experimentation and with a reasonable expectation of 
success.76 The Board _noted that they "do not lightly dismiss appellants' 
argument that the examiner has not given sufficient weight to the structure 
or form of the compound or composition, and has improperly concentrated 
on the method of making it,"77 yet, in the end, they did not waver from this 
process-centered approach. 78 
The Federal Circuit very recently reversed this decision of the Board 
in an opinion that calls into question both of these possible limitations on the 
reach of its previous decision in In re Bell.79 First, the court reaffirmed that 
the obviousness of a DNA sequence is to be determined by reference to its 
chemical structure rather than by considering the manner of its isolation. 
The court squarely held that a cDNA sequence was not rendered prima fade 
obvious by prior art disclosures of a partial amino acid sequence for a 
protein, plus a general method of isolating a cDNA molecule, if there are no 
structurally similar DNA molecules in the prior art: 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
A prior art disclosure of the amino acid 
sequence of a protein does not necessarily 
render particular DNA molecules encoding 
the protein obvious because the redundancy 
78 See also Ex parte Tanksley, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (Bd. Pat. App. & 
Interf. 1992) (affirming rejection of claims to tomato cDNA clones that 
included ribulose biphosphate carboxylase ("RuBPC") genes in part on 
grounds of obviousness, where they were isolated in a manner disclosed 
in the prior art and the procedures utilized to establish the function of 
those clones were all well-known in the art, whether or not the exact 
sequence of any of the clones was identical to the sequence of previously 
disclosed RuBPC clones); Ex parte Movva, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Bd. 
Pat. App. & Interf. 1993) (affirming rejection of claims to DNA sequence 
and recombinant DNA molecules coding for swine growth hormone based 
on evidence that, at the time of the invention, one of ordinary skill in the 
art had ample reason to isolate a DNA sequence encoding swine growth 
hormone and would have found it obvious to do so using known 
processes with a reasonable expectation of success). 
79 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1215 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
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of the genetic code permits one to 
hypothesize an enormous number of DNA 
sequences coding for the protein. No 
particular one of these DNAs can be obvious 
unless there is something in the prior art to 
lead to the particular DNA and indicate that 
it should be prepared . . . .  This is so even 
though one skilled in the art knew that some 
DNA, albeit not in purified and isolated form, 
did exist. The [claimed DNA sequences] are 
specific compounds not suggested by the 
prior art. 80 
29 
The court stated that the PTO's focus on methods for isolating the claimed 
DNA sequences was "misplaced because the claims at issue define 
compounds, not methods,"81 and cited In re Bell for the principle that "the 
existence of a general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is 
essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific molecules 
themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of other prior art that 
suggests the claimed DNAs."82 That the prior art might have been sufficient 
to motivate those working in the field to prepare an undefined cDNA coding 
for a known or partially known protein did not make obvious any particular 
resulting cDNA sequence: "The fact that one can conceive a general process 
in advance for preparing an undefined compound does not mean that a 
claimed specific compound was precisely envisioned and therefore 
obvious."83 This language suggests that a DNA sequence must be "precisely 
envisioned," and not merely readily obtainable, in order to be obvious. Thus 
the specific cDNA sequences set forth in the patent application were not 
made obvious by the disclosure of a partial amino acid sequence and general 
cloning methods. 
Second, the court concluded that the prior art did not render obvious 
the broader generic claims to all DNA sequences encoding HBGFs, although 
80 Id. at 1558-59, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
81 Id. at 1559, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216. 
30 AIPLAQ.J. Vol. 23: 1 
the court suggested that such broad claims might have been obvious if the 
full amino acid sequence for the protein had been disclosed in the prior art: 
Such an idea ffiight have been obvious from 
the complete amino acid sequence of the 
protein, coupled with knowledge of the 
genetic code, because this information may 
have enabled a person of ordinary skill in the 
art to envision the idea of, and, perhaps with 
the aid of a computer, even identify all 
members of the claimed genus. The [prior 
art] reference, however, only discloses a 
partial amino acid sequence, and thus it 
appears that, based on the above analysis, the 
claimed genus would not have been obvious 
over this prior art disclosure.84 
The court noted, however, that in the absence of disclosure in the 
specification of how to obtain any DNA sequences coding for HBGFs other 
than the specific cDNAs set forth in the application, these broader claims 
might not be fully supported by an enabling disclosure.85 
B. Nonobviousness Of The NIH Inventions 
Turning to the facts of the NIH applications with these cases in mind, 
we first distinguish between the method used to obtain the sequences and 
the sequences that were thereby obtained. We note that the '831 application 
claimed the method used to obtain the sequences as a patentable invention. 
Because '831 was converted to a Statutory Invention Registration ("SIR") and 
because the claims of a SIR are not examined for novelty and 
nonobviousness, the PTO did not pass on the obviousness of the method, 
and we lack the technical competence to make this determination ourselves. 
Nonetheless, there is some evidence on the face of the specifications that the 
methods (described as employing "conventional automated DNA 
sequencing technology") and materials (commercially available and custom­
made cDNA libraries) used to obtain the sequences were substantially 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
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disclosed in the prior art. Moreover, reactions in the scientific community 
to news of the NIH patent filings indicate that some scientists at the time 
viewed the technology used to obtain the sequences as not requiring more 
than ordinary inventive skill.86 
On the other hand, perhaps it could be argued that the prior art 
discouraged or taught away from the approach taken by Venter and his 
colleagues in the relevant time period. The '195 specification indicates that, 
contrary to the expectations of the scientific community, the applicants had 
used cDNA screening and sequencing to discover a large number of 
heretofore unknoWll human genes. If the prior art gave reason to doubt that 
the method used would yield the results obtained, it might be argued that 
the method was nonobvious, and that the nonobviousness of the method 
should confer patentability on the results (i.e., the sequences). But even if the 
method used by Venter and his colleagues was nonobvious as of the '831 
filing date, this fact would at most confer patentability on sequences claimed 
prior to the time that the method was placed in the public domain. Once the 
method was publicly disclosed, the nonobviousness of any subsequently 
discovered sequences could not be predicated on the nonobviousness of the 
method itself, because the method would be in the prior art. Thus the 
potential significance of the nonobviousness of the Venter methodology in 
making an affirmative case for patentability is quite limited. 
Even if the method used to obtain the sequences is obvious, it does 
not necessarily follow that the sequences themselves are also obvious. 
Although the matter is by no means free from doubt, we now think it is more 
likely than not that the Federal Circuit would focus on the structure of the 
claimed sequences rather than on the method of obtaining them in assessing 
their obviousness. The decisions of the Federal Circuit in In re Bell87 and In 
re Deuel88 suggest that if the prior art does not include structurally similar 
sequences, the sequences themselves will not be deemed obvious. Under 
this approach, at the very least those claims that are narrowly drawn to 
specific, novel sequences with no significant partial homologies to known 
sequences will probably be considered nonobvious. On the other hand, any 
86 See e.g., John Casey, The Gene Kings, BUSINESS WEEK, May 22, 1995, at 25. 
87 991 F.2d 781, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
88 51 F.3d 1552, 1558, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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sequences that have significant partial similarities to known sequences may 
be considered prima fade obvious if they were obtained through an obvious 
method and if the prior art sequences were of sufficient interest to motivate 
the search for other, similar sequences. 
Although the Federal Circuit now twice has endorsed this structural 
approach to determinations of obviousness for DNA sequences of 
specifically identified genes, it is still not entirely clear that the court would 
eschew consideration of the obviousness of the method of obtaining 
sequences in considering the patentability of random partial cDNA 
sequences of unknown function of the sort claimed in the NIH patent 
applications. Such an approach would seem to make all novel DNA 
sequences patentable, however trivial the scientific advance that led to their 
identification. This position collapses the novelty and nonobviousness 
requirements for DNA sequences. Moreover, a rigid requirement of 
structural similarity to a known sequence before a DNA sequence will be 
considered prima fade obvious seems to ignore the reason why structural 
similarities have been considered relevant to past determinations of the 
obviousness of new compounds in favor of rote incantation of the facts on 
which prior decisions have turned, a dubious basis for deciding new cases 
involving new facts. 
The reason that structural similarity to a compound in the prior art 
has been considered relevant to prima fade obviousness in past decisions in 
the chemical field is that the usefulness of a prior art compound is presumed 
to provide the motivation to search for homologues.89 With this motivation, 
it is likely that others working in the field will use known methods to find 
similar compounds, and only if the compounds obtained from such a search 
possess surprising properties not present in the prior art will they be 
nonobvious and therefore patentable. 
A superficial analogy to these past cases might seem to call for an 
inquiry into whether the prior art disclosed sequences that were structurally 
similar to those found by Venter. But a more reasoned approach instead 
might ask whether the prior art provided comparable motivation to others 
working in the field to do what Venter and his colleagues did in 1991. While 
we have not undertaken a comprehensive review of the technical literature, 
we note that the 1988 report of the National Research Council on Mapping 
89 In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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and Sequencing the Human Genome devotes a couple of pages to analyzing 
the relative merits of cDNA sequencing versus genomic DNA sequencing, 
suggesting that there was significant (if, in the view of the authors of that 
report, misguided) support for focussing the resources of the Human 
Genome Project initially on sequencing large libraries of cDNAs.90 It does 
not necessarily follow that other investigators would be motivated to 
undertake large-scale partial sequencing of randomly selected cDNA clones 
of the sort pursued by Venter, as opposed to more focussed searches for 
particular genes of interest. 
But whatever the level of motivation to engage in such sequencing 
prior to Venter's 1991 disclosure, that disclosure set off a frenzy of cDNA 
sequencing activity that continues to this day. Under these circumstances it 
seems reasonable to conclude that, at least since late 1991, the prior art has 
disclosed enough to motivate others working in the field to find new ESTs 
through random partial sequencing of clones from cDNA libraries. 
Therefore, the sequences obtained subsequent to that date by Venter and 
others through the same general method might be deemed prima fade 
obvious, even if there are no structurally similar sequences in the prior art, 
for the same reason that past decisions have held novel chemicals prima 
fade obvious when the prior art discloses structurally similar compounds: 
in both cases, the prior art provides motivation to use familiar methods to 
construct the claimed inventions. We reiterate, however, that the Federal 
Circuit so far has not taken this approach, and that its decisions in In re Bell91 
and In re Deuel92 cast some doubt on its willingness to do so. 
It could be argued that finding prirna fade obviousness on the basis 
of the method of sequencing alone violates the statement in section 103 of the 
Patent Act93 that "patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in 
which the invention was made."94 On the other hand, a finding of prirna 
90 NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN 
GENOME (1988). 
91 991 F.2d 781, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
92 51 F.3d 1552, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
93 35 u.s.c. § 103 (1994). 
94 Id. 
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facie obviousness does not necessarily "negative" patentability, but merely 
shifts to the applicant the burden of showing unexpected properties of the 
claimed inventions not present or suggested in the prior art. This approach 
has the benefit of withholding patent protection from newly discovered 
chemicals until the inventor is in a position to disclose more about them than 
their structure alone. But perhaps lack of utility is a more appropriate 
doctrinal basis for rejecting such applications than obviousness. 
If prima facie obviousness is established, could NIH sustain its 
burden of showing unexpected properties for the claimed sequences? 
Perhaps they could do so with a little more work, but we do not believe that 
they have done so to date. For the most part all that we know about the 
disclosed sequences is that they are portions of human genes, which is to be 
expected of partial sequences obtained from human cDNA. In Ex parte 
Anderson,95 the Board affirmed an obviousness rejection of claims to a DNA 
sequence encoding a mature human interleukin-3 ("IL-3") protein having a 
proline residue at position 8 over prior art disclosing a DNA sequence 
encoding an IL-3 protein having serine at position 8. The structural 
similarity gave rise to a prima facie case of obviousness and shifted to the 
applicants the burden of offering rebuttal evidence showing that the claimed 
compositions possess unexpected improved properties or properties that the 
prior art does not have.96 The Board held that the fact that the claimed IL-3 
sequence with proline at position 8 was the dominant allele was not 
sufficient to overcome the prima facie case of obviousness without an 
explanation of the practical advantages that come from having possession 
of the dominant allele.97 NIH has not even made this much of a showing 
about the properties of its sequences. 
In sum, although the nonobviousness of the claimed sequences is 
uncertain, on the basis of recent decisions of the Federal Circuit we think it 
is more likely than not that nonobviousness could be established for those 
sequences that are not similar to any previously known sequences. If any of 
the sequences show partial sequence similarity to known sequences, they 
may be considered prima facie obvious. One could argue that the prior art 
95 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1866 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993). 
% Id. at 1869. 
97 Id. at 1870. 
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since 1991 has plainly disclosed enough information to motivate those 
working in the field to apply routine sequencing techniques to obtain partial 
sequences for randomly selected clones from cDNA libraries, and that all 
sequences obtained since that date should therefore be deemed prim.a fade 
obvious. However, the Federal Circuit has not endorsed this analytical 
approach, and its most recent decisions suggest a far lower standard of 
nonobviousness for DNA sequences. If any of the sequences are considered 
prima fade obvious, it does not appear that NIH has sustained its burden of 
showing that the sequences possess surprising or unexpected properties. 
While recent Federal Circuit decisions suggest that the 
nonobviousness requirement may be more readily satisfied for ESTs than 
was previously thought, these decisions also call into question a key 
argument in favor of patenting ESTs. In the debate over patenting ESTs, 
some people argued that if ESTs were published without obtaining patent 
protection, their disclosure would render obvious, and therefore 
unpatentable, the full-length genes of which they are a part, thereby 
preventing subsequent researchers and firms who wish to develop 
commercial products based on such genes from obtaining exclusive rights 
under a patent.98 Patents on ESTs, and on the full-length genes that could be 
obtained by using ESTs as probes, would therefore provide an otherwise 
unavailable source of exclusive rights to protect the interests of those who 
develop commercial products related to genes for which ESTs have been 
publicly disclosed. 
This argument hinges on disclosure of partial DNA sequences 
rendering full-length genes obvious. But if partial or even full amino acid 
sequences for a protein are not sufficient to make the corresponding DNA 
sequence obvious, it seems unlikely that a partial DNA sequence would 
make the full-length DNA sequence obvious. Thus the Federal Circuit's 
position that the obviousness of a method for obtaining a DNA sequence is 
irrelevant to the obviousness of the sequence itself is a two-edged sword in 
the debate over patenting ESTs, serving on one hand to reduce the force of 
an argument against the patentability of ESTs, while on the other hand 
undermining arguments for the necessity of obtaining such patents to 
safeguard the commercial viability of future products. 
98 See, e.g., Reid Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations 
for Knowledge and Commercialization, 257 ScIENCE 908, 911-12 (1992). 
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Although we trunk it is unlikely that disclosure of ESTs will make the 
corresponding full-length genes obvious and therefore unpatentable, 
disclosure of full-length genes may well render obvious related genes with 
similar DNA sequences. We can foresee this issue arising in the near future 
as the owners of private EST databases take newly discovered genes of 
interest that are published by others, compare them to the previously 
undisclosed sequences in their databases, obtain full-length sequences for 
any ESTs that show similarities to the newly identified genes, and file patent 
applications on them. If such a strategy is successful, it could give the 
owners of EST databases the power to fence-in the patent rights of those who 
have identified new genes of interest by obtaining patents on all related 
genes. Will these related genes be considered prima fade obvious by virtue 
of their structural similarity to the publicly disclosed sequences? Certainly 
the initial disclosure of one member of an interesting gene family would 
provide motivation to others working in the field to probe available 
sequence databases for related genes, perhaps with a reasonable expectation 
of success.99 Yet structural similarity, rather than motivation and reasonable 
expectation of success, seems to be the cornerstone of the Federal Circuit's 
nonobviousness analysis in this area to date.100 Moreover, some of the more 
expansive language from In re Deuel could be understood as requiring that 
the prior art allow the structure of the subsequently discovered genes to be 
"precisely envisioned" before they would be considered obvious, suggesting 
a rather exacting standard of structural similarity. Resolution of the issue 
may thus tum on the degree of similarity between the prior art sequences 
and the related sequences found through use of the EST databases. Those 
who discover new genes of interest and do not wish to have their patent 
rights fenced in would be well advised to identify and claim related 
99 As more sequences are entered in public domain databases that are 
freely available to the scientific community, the likelihood of success in 
finding related genes increases, making it more likely that the related 
genes would be deemed obvious. On the other hand, sequences that could 
only be obtained through access to a proprietary sequence database that 
is not generally available to the scientific community might still be 
considered nonobvious if the database were not included in the prior art. 
100 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1214 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). But cf In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349-50, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1941, 1943 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[G]eneralization is to be avoided 
insofar as specific structures are alleged to be prima fade obvious one 
from the other."). 
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sequences, including those sequences that may be partially disclosed in 
public databases, before they publish their results. 
VI. DISCLOSURE 
In recent years, the Federal Circuit and the PTO have frequently 
invoked the disclosure requirements set forth in section 1 12 of the Patent Act 
in rejecting or holding invalid patent claims involving pNA sequences.101 
We believe that many of the claims in these applications may be vulnerable 
to challenge on these grounds, particularly the full gene claims and the panel 
claims. 
Section 112 of the Patent Act provides: 
The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, 
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as 
to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same, 
and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention. 
The specification shall conclude with one or 
more claims particularly pointing out and 
distinctly claiming the subject matter which 
the applicant regards as his invention.102 
The courts and the PTO read the first paragraph of this prov1s10n as 
imposing three distinct requirements: (1) a written description of the 
invention; (2) an enabling disclosure of how to make and use the invention; 
and (3) disclosure of the best mode of practicing the invention known to the 
101 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216; Amgen, Inc. 
v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied sub nom, Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, 
Inc., 112 S.Ct. 169 (1991). 
102 35 u.s.c. § 112 (1994). 
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inventor at the time of filing.103 The second paragraph further requires that 
the claim language clearly define the invention. 
An inventor who is able to comply with these requirements may 
obtain a patent covering subject matter that she has not yet actually reduced 
to practice in the laboratory. Thus the Venter applications claim not only the 
specific ESTs that had actually been identified and sequenced, but also 
complementary sequences, allelic variations and portions thereof, full genes 
corresponding or hybridizing to any of the foregoing sequences, fragments 
of such full genes, vectors containing any such sequences or genes, panels 
of ESTS or sequence fragments, and antisense oligonucleotides or triple helix 
probes capable of blocking expression of the products of the full genes. 
The examiner rejected the claims of the '195 application for lack of an 
enabling disclosure, lack of an adequate written description of the 
inventions, and indefiniteness of the claim language. We consider each of 
these issues in tum. 
A. Enablement/Scope 
The requirement of an enabling disclosure of how to make and use 
the invention is justified as a means of ensuring that the public receives its 
quid pro quo for the patent monopoly. To the extent that it focuses on 
disclosure of how to use an invention, this requirement overlaps with the 
utility requirement discussed above. 
Enablement is a particularly important limitation on the patentability 
of prophetic claims to inventions that the applicant has not yet actually 
reduced to practice. What is required is a disclosure that would allow a 
person of ordinary skill in the field to reduce the invention to practice 
without "undue experimentation."104 What constitutes "undue 
experimentation" varies from one field to the next. 
103 Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565 
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Transco Prods., Inc., v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 
F.3d 551, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Vas-Cath, Inc. v. 
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
104 Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993); 
Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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The enablement requirement should not present a significant barrier 
to the patenting of DNA sequences that have been fully and accurately set 
forth in the specification. But some of the claims extend beyond those 
disclosed sequences to cover other sequences (including full genes operably 
coding for human gene products) that might ultimately be obtained by using 
the ESTs as probes. In rejecting the claims of the '195 application for failure 
to provide an enabling disclosure, the examiner noted that the specification 
lacked information about the coding regions of the disclosed DNA 
sequences, and questioned whether the ESTs in fact have coding regions: 
Applicants assert that one of skill in the art 
can determine coding regions with routine 
skill and then spend three pages briefly 
outlining the cloning, selection, sequencing, 
and sequence analyses and judgments needed 
to make the determination. These 
manipulations are more than routine 
experimentation . . . .  Even though the ESTs of 
the instant application were derived from 
cDNA, the application fails to establish that 
each and every expressed sequence has a 
protein coding region or whether a given EST 
that has a protein coding region is eventually 
translated. Some of the RNAs from which the 
ESTs were derived may not be mRNAs or 
may be mRNAs that are not translated. 
Whether these prophetic claims are enabled by the disclosure is 
ultimately a technical question that is beyond our expertise. Nonetheless, we 
note that decisions of the Federal Circuit in biotechnology cases seem to 
reflect a more generous view than the examiner appears to hold of how 
much experimentation may be tolerated before a disclosure will be 
considered nonenabling. For example, in In re Wands, 105 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a rejection of claims to an immunoassay utilizing monoclonal high 
affinity immunoglobulin M antibodies, even though the antibodies described 
in the disclosure could not be produced without going through extensive 
procedures to prepare hybridomas and to screen them for production of the 
desired antibodies. The court noted that there was a high level of skill in the 
105 858 F.2d 731, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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monoclonal antibody art, that all of the methods needed to practice the 
invention were well known to those of ordinary skill in the art, that the 
disclosure provided considerable direction and guidance on how to practice 
the invention and presented working examples, that the nature of 
monoclonal antibody technology is that it involves screening hybridomas to 
determine which ones secrete antibodies with desired characteristics, and 
that practitioners in this field routinely engage in such screening. 
M�ny decisions of the Board involving claims to DNA sequences 
coding for proteins of known function and partially known amino acid 
sequence indicate that techniques for obtaining cDNAs using hybridization 
probes are well-known in the art.106 It arguably follows that the use of E STs 
as probes to obtain full genes does not involve undue experimentation. 
On the other hand, a salient distinction between these prior decisions 
and the present case is that the Venter applications for the most part do not 
suggest the use of any particular E ST as a probe for finding any particular 
gene, whereas the disclosures at issue in the prior cases suggested the use of 
particular probes to find target genes. The work that remains to be done to 
find a target gene is analogous to searching for a particular individual in a 
telephone directory that has the names and addresses omitted. Even if we 
assume that each phone number will lead the caller to someone-an 
assumption that may or may not have a valid corollary for E STs-the 
compilation of information is of limited value in finding any given person, 
even if that person does in fact have a telephone number in the directory and 
would pick up the phone if the correct number were dialed. Nor, to our 
knowledge, is this sort of screening effort routine in the field, in contrast to 
the effort involved in screening hybridomas to identify producers of desired 
antibodies that the Federal Circuit concluded did not amount to undue 
experimentation in In re Wands.107 Therefore, it might be argued that undue 
experimentation is required to find full genes of interest using the Venter 
disclosures. 
106 See, e.g., Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. & 
Interf. 1993), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 34 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Ex parte Movva, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1027 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993). 
107 858 F.2d 731, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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A case involving somewhat analogous facts is Ex parte Tanksley108 in 
which the Board affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims to tomato cDNA 
clones on grounds of obviousness and failure to identify distinctly the 
claimed inventions. The Board went on to note that, in the event of further 
prosecution, the examiner should consider whether undue experimentation 
is required to practice the invention given that each of the uses suggested by 
applicants for their inventions involved, as a preliminary step, the 
identification of clones of interest, a procedure that the prior art suggested 
involves significant difficulty. A similar argument could be made with 
respect to many of the claims in the NIH applications, which cover DNA 
sequences that may not be put to use without first identifying, through 
nonroutine experimentation, which of the many sequences are of interest for 
which possible purposes. 
The enabling disclosure requirement also serves as a limitation on the 
permissible breadth of patent claims, providing a basis for rejecting broad, 
generic claims for which only a small number of embodiments have been 
disclosed. A number of decisions have invalidated broad patent claims to 
DNA sequences on the ground that the disclosure is not as broad as the 
claims. For example, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical, 109 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a lower court decision holding invalid a broad generic claim 
covering all DNA sequences that will encode any polypeptide having an 
amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of erythropoietin (EPO) to 
possess the property of increasing production of red blood cells. The basis 
for the holding was that the broad claim was not adequately enabled by the 
disclosure in the specification of details for preparing only a few EPO analog 
genes: 
Amgen has claimed every possible analog of 
a gene containing about 4,000 nucleotides, 
with a disclosure only of how to make EPO 
and a very few analogs . . . .  Considering the 
structural complexity of the EPO gene, the 
manifold possibilities for change in its 
structure, with attendant uncertainty as to 
108 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1388 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992). 
HJ9 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 1 12 S. 
Ct. 169 (1991). 
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what utility will be possessed by these 
analogs, we consider that more is needed 
concerning identifying the various analogs 
that are within the scope of the claim, 
methods for making them, and structural 
requirements for producing compounds with 
EPO-like activity. It is not sufficient, having 
made the gene and a handful of analogs 
whose activity has not been clearly 
ascertained, to claim all possible genetic 
sequences that have EPO-like activity.110 
Vol. 23: 1 
The Board took a similar approach in Ex parte Ishizaka, 111 affirming 
rejection on grounds of obviousness of claims to DNA sequences encoding 
glycosylation inhibiting factors ("GIFs") and setting forth as a new ground 
of rejection failure to provide an enabling disclosure corresponding to the 
breadth of the claims. The claims purported to cover fragments of the 
disclosed nucleotide sequences of as few as eighteen to twenty bases which 
are capable of being used as hybridization probes to obtain additional 
nucleic acids encoding GIF, as well as "a sequence of nucleotides effectively 
homologous" to such sequences, defined in the specification to mean at least 
fifty percent homologous. The Board noted that there was no disclosure in 
the specification showing that any such small fragments had been or could 
be so employed by others without undue experimentation112 and cited 
Amgen in concluding that the broad claims to fragments and homologous 
sequences were not adequately enabled.113 
The NIH patent applications contain many claims that are 
comparable to those held invalid in these decisions, including, in particular, 
110 Id. at 1214, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28. 
111 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1625-26 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992). 
112 Id. at 1626. 
113 Id. 
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the full gene claims114 and the panel claims, 115 and are no better supported in 
the specification. Indeed, these broad NIH claims may be particularly 
vulnerable to challenge on this ground because the specifications contain no 
empirically-tested working examples to support them. 
The Federal Circuit stressed the importance of working examples in 
In re Vaeck. 116 In that case the applicant claimed a chimeric gene comprising 
a gene for an insecticidal protein derived from a Bacillus bacterium united 
with a DNA promoter effective for expressing the Bacillus gene in a host 
cyanobacterium, as well as plasmids containing the chimeric gene and host 
cyanobacteria expressing the gene. The specification disclosed two 
particular Bacillus species as sources of insecticidal protein and nine genera 
114 Representative of the full gene claims are claims 4 and 10 of the '195 
application. As amended, the language of claim 4 reads as follows: 
An isolated polynucleotide operably coding for a native 
human polypeptide or protein, which includes a region 
coding for the same amino acid sequence as a native 
human coding region corresponding to a sequence 
designated as one of [the disclosed ESTs]. 
As amended, the language of claim 10 reads as follows: 
An isolated polynucleotide coding for a human protein 
or polypeptide, which includes a coding region 
corresponding to [one of the disclosed ESTs]; or a 
polynucleotide complementary thereto. 
Each of these claims potentially covers a great many sequences, none of 
which has been set forth in the specification. 
115 Consider, for example, claim 22 of the '195 application, which, as 
amended, claims: 
A panel of at least 100 isolated polynucleotides having 
the sequences of [one of the ESTs or a fragment thereof 
at least 150 base pairs in length]. 
An astronomical number of such panels could be constructed out of the 
disclosed sequences, but no such panel is actually disclosed in the 
specification much less tested to see if it can be used for tissue typing or 
forensic identification as asserted. 
116 947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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of cyanobacteria as useful hosts, but gave only a single working example 
detailing the transformation of one strain of cyanobacteria. In affirming the 
examiner's rejection for lack of enablement of the full breadth of the claims, 
the Federal Circuit noted that "[t]here is no reasonable correlation between 
the narrow disclosure in appellants' specification and the broad scope of 
protection sought in the claims encompassing gene expression in any and all 
cyanobacteria."117 More recently, in In re Goodman, 118 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed rejection of broad claims to a method for producing mammalian 
peptides in plant cells supported by a disclosure of only a single working 
example involving the expression of gamma-interferon in tobacco plants. 
The court concluded that the specification did not adequately enable the 
broad scope of the claims. 
Enablement is a peculiarly fact-driven inquiry, and the facts of these 
cases can certainly be distinguished from the NIH applications. 
Nonetheless, these and other decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Board 
suggest a parsimonious attitude toward claim scope for biotechnology 
patents, restricting claimants to that which they have demonstrated can be 
done successfully through their own working examples. While the Federal 
Circuit consistently has affirmed that it is sometimes appropriate to allow 
generic claims covering more than the particular examples disclosed in the 
specification even in unpredictable fields, 119 as the number of variations 
embraced by a claim multiply, the court seems to disapprove of broad patent 
claims that are supported by only a small number of working examples. 
This trend does not bode well for broad prophetic claims, such as most of 
those sought by NIH, that are not supported by any empirically-tested 
working examples. 
B. Written Description 
A related difficulty in claiming subject matter that goes beyond what 
the inventor has actually reduced to practice is the written description 
requirement. The Federal Circuit views this requirement as "separate and 
distinct" from the enablement requirement: "The purpose of the 'written 
117 Id. 
118 11 F.3d 1046, 1052, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010, 2015 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
1 19 E.g., Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
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description' requirement is broader than to merely explain how to 'make and 
use;' the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled 
in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the 
invention. The invention is, for purposes of the 'written description' inquiry, 
whatever is now claimed. "120 In other words, while the purpose of the 
enablement requirement is to put the public in possession of the invention, 
the purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the 
inventor was in possession of the invention as of the filing date and is 
therefore entitled to claim that date as the prima facie date of invention. The 
written description requirement most commonly presents a problem in cases 
where an applicant subsequently seeks to claim the benefit of a previous 
filing date in support of claims that were not included in the application as 
originally filed,121 but in Fiers v. Revel the Federal Circuit invoked the written 
description requirement in rejecting prophetic claims to a DNA sequence 
filed before the inventor had actually obtained the sequence.122 
Fiers v. Revel was a three-way priority contest among rival foreign 
claimants to patent rights in the DNA sequence coding for human fibroblast 
beta-interferon ("P-IF"). Understanding this decision requires a brief 
digression into arcane rules for determining priority of invention under U. S. 
patent law. Section 102(g) of the Patent Act calls for determining priority of 
invention by reference to the competing claimants' respective dates of 
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, and also "the 
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to 
practice." Reduction to practice may be either "actual" (i.e., making a 
tangible embodiment of the invention in the laboratory) or "constructive" 
(i.e., filing a patent application that provides an adequate disclosure of the 
invention). Filing a foreign patent application is sufficient to establish 
120 Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1111, 1 1 16 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). 
121 This may happen when an applicant adds new claims by amendment, 
or seeks the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed foreign or U.S. 
application for claims of a later-filed application, or, in an interference 
proceeding, when rival applicants claim patent rights corresponding to an 
interference count that differs somewhat from the claims they had 
originally filed. 
122 Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1606 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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priority as of the foreign filing date so long as the foreign application meets 
the disclosure requirements of U. S. patent law, but an applicant who seeks 
to prove a priority date prior to the filing date may not rely on any activities 
that occurred overseas. 123 
Fiers sought to establish priority by proving that he was first to 
conceive of the invention and was diligent thereafter up to his British filing 
date. His British application included a disclosure of the complete DNA 
sequence for the gene. He claimed that his conception occurred when he 
disclosed a method for isolating the gene to American scientists who brought 
his protocol back to the United States. These scientists submitted affidavits 
stating that the protocol was enabling-Le., that one of ordinary skill in the 
field would have been able to follow the protocol to isolate P-IF DNA 
without undue experimentation. Fiers sought to distinguish the Amgen 
decision on this basis, arguing that, in contrast to the uncertainties attending 
the method held to be nonenabling in that case (screening a genomic DNA 
library with fully degenerate probes to find the EPO gene), his own method 
for finding the P-IF gene could have been easily carried out by one of 
ordinary skill in the art. The Federal Circuit rejected this narrow reading of 
Amgen, 124 holding that "irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the 
method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any 
chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its 
functional utility."125 In other words, proof that the applicants were in 
possession of an operative method of obtaining the DNA was not sufficient 
to establish conception of the DNA itself. Conception only of a process for 
making the DNA would at most support a subsequent product-by-process 
claim to the DNA obtained by the disclosed process, and would not support 
123 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 104 (1994). The implementing legislation for the 
North American Free Trade Agreement changed U.S. law to permit 
inventive activities in Canada and Mexico to be proven in support of a 
priority claim. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 182, 107 Stat. 2057. 
124 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1168, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
125 Id. at 1169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
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a broader claim to the DNA itself without limitation as to the means by 
which it is obtained.126 
The court invoked a similar principle in dismissing Revel's claim to 
priority on the basis of his earlier-filed Israeli patent application.127 The 
Israeli application disclosed a method for isolating a fragment of the DNA 
coding for P-IF as well as a method for isolating mRNA coding for P-IF, but 
did not disclose a complete DNA sequence. The Federal Circuit concurred 
126 A product-by-process claim is a claim to a product defined in the claim 
language in terms of the method by which it is made. Most decisions hold 
that such claims are limited in scope to products made by the particular 
method recited in the claim language and would not cover identical 
products made by other methods. See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. 
Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 842, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 
1992), although, there is some authority for the view that the recited 
process does not limit the scope of product-by-process claims. See, e.g., 
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583, 
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Following Fiers, NIH 
submitted new claims 44-55 of '195 in product-by-process form. The 
Federal Circuit did not clearly indicate that such claims would be 
patentable in Fiers, but merely stated that disclosure of an enabling 
method for obtaining a gene would at most support a claim to the gene in 
product-by-process form: 
Our statement in Amgen that conception may occur, 
inter alia, when one is able to define a chemical by its 
method of preparation requires that the DNA be 
claimed by its method of preparation. . . . Before 
reduction to practice, conception only of a process for 
making a substance, without a conception of a 
structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can 
at most constitute a conception of the substance claimed 
as a process. Conception of a substance claimed per se 
without reference to a process requires conception of its 
structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or 
physical properties. 
984 F.2d at 1 169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05. Even if the NIH 
disclosures are considered enabling as to the full gene claims, we note 
that, if those claims are limited to full genes obtained by the recited 
process, the effective scope of the patent monopoly would be quite 
narrow, as would the commercial significance of the patents. 
127 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
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with the finding of the Board that Revel's disclosure was insufficient to 
satisfy the "written description" requirement of section 112 of the Patent 
Act, 128 noting that the Board had correctly stated that this provision requires 
a disclosure that is adequate to convey to others in the same field that the 
inventor was in possession of the claimed invention as of the filing date: 
An adequate written description of a DNA 
requires more thclll a mere statement that it is 
part of the invention and reference to a 
potential method for isolating it; what is 
required is a description of the DNA itself. 
Revel's specification does not do that. . . .  A 
bare reference to a DNA with a statement that 
it can be obtained by reverse transcription is 
not a description; it does not indicate that 
Revel was in possession of the DNA. .. . As 
we stated in Amgen and reaffirmed above, 
such a disclosure just represents a wish, or 
arguably a plan, for obtaining the DNA. If a 
conception of a DNA requires a precise 
definition, such as by structure, formula, 
chemical name, or physical properties, as we 
have held, then a description also requires 
that degree of specificity. To paraphrase the 
Board, one cannot describe what one has not 
conceived. 129 
This decision potentially presents a major obstacle to the patenting 
of prophetic claims to DNA sequences that have not yet been set forth in the 
specifications and would appear to render unpatentable most of the 
commercially significant claims of the NIH applications. Only those claims 
that are limited to the disclosed E STs themselves, and perhaps product-by­
process claims to other sequences obtained through the use of those 
sequences as probes, would appear to satisfy the written description 
requirement as articulated by the Federal Circuit in Fiers. 
128 Id. at 1 170, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
129 Id. at 1170-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
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We think it is unlikely that the Board will read the Fiers decision 
narrowly. In Fiddes v. Baird,130 the Board cited Fiers in a priority contest over 
inventorship of recombinant DNA molecules encoding fibroblast growth 
factors ("FGFs"). Baird claimed priority on the basis of an application that set 
forth the amino acid sequence for bovine pituitary FGF and a theoretical 
DNA sequence encoding that protein, along with a method for obtaining a 
cDNA corresponding to the protein, but not the naturally occurring gene 
encoding the protein. The Board held that this disclosure did not contain a 
written description for the broad class of mammalian FGFs, and further 
questioned whether the disclosure was enabling even for Baird's narrower 
claims to the native gene encoding bovine pituitary FGF.131 
One could try to distinguish these cases by arguing that the written 
description requirement, like the enablement requirement, becomes easier 
to satisfy as the state of knowledge advances in a field. The standard is 
whether the written description is adequate to convey to other skilled 
practitioners in the field that the applicant was in possession of the invention 
at the time of filing. As genetics research has advanced, it may have become 
increasingly routine to use a probe to find a gene, such that by the time of 
the NIH filings other practitioners might have regarded someone who had 
found an EST as being for all practical purposes in possession of the 
corresponding full-length gene. 
One problem with this line of argument is that it seems to overlook 
the distinction that the Federal Circuit has consistently maintained between 
the enablement and written description requirements. Indeed, in Fiers v. 
Revel132 the court rejected the priority claims of both Fiers and Revel without 
challenging their assertions that their disclosures were enabling. 
The message that emerges from these decisions is that the 
patentability of a DNA sequence is doubtful until one can set forth the actual 
sequence. Unless the Federal Circuit and PTO retreat from this position, it 
is unlikely that an applicant could claim a full-length gene by disclosing 
nothing more than a partial sequence and a probing methodology. The 
130 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1483 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993). 
131 Id. 
132 984 F.2d at 1171, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605-06. 
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written description requirement, as recently construed in cases involving 
claims to DNA sequences, appears to be an insurmountable hurdle for all of 
the claims in the NIH applications that go beyond the sequences actually set 
forth in the specification. Even a fully enabling disclosure of how to use a 
probe to find a full-length gene will not be sufficient to support a claim to the 
full-length gene, except perhaps in narrow, product-by-process form. In that 
case, as a practical matter, it may be that the allowable claims could not 
confer a commercially effective monopoly in anything more than the ESTs 
themselves. 
C. Definiteness 
A further difficulty for some of the claims is the requirement that the 
claim language "particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention."133 The purpose of the 
requirement for definite claim language is twofold: (1) to allow proper 
examination for patentability; and (2) to give notice to the public of what 
constitutes infringement.134 This requirement is likely to be particularly 
problematic for claims to sequences that have not been identified in the 
specification. In Ex parte Tanksley, 135 the Board affirmed the examiner's 
rejection of claims to selected tomato cDNA clones that had not been 
sequenced and, for the most part, had not been identified by biological 
function, on the ground that the clones had not been adequately described 
to allow either proper examination in comparison to the prior art or 
adequate notice to the public of what the claims cover. 
We have already noted in the discussion of novelty above that many 
of the claims cover sequences that are not set forth in the specification and 
that may not even include sequences set forth in the specification. Thus, for 
example, claim 17 of '195 covers any polynucleotide fragment of at least 150 
base pairs from any gene corresponding to any of the disclosed ESTs. There 
is no way that an examiner can effectively search the prior art to see if it 
includes any sequences covered by this claim. Nor does the claim language 
give notice to the public of the scope of its coverage. Both of the policy 
133 35 u.s.c. § 112 (1994). 
134 Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277, 80 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 451, 453 (1949). 
135 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1386 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992). 
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interests behind the requirement for clear and definite claim language are 
thus squarely implicated by the facts of this case. 
In sum, the requirements of an enabling disclosure, written 
description of the invention, and definiteness of claim language appear not 
to be satisfied for many of the claims of these patent applications, 
particularly those claims that cover sequences and panels of sequences that 
are not set forth in the specification. While we lack the technical expertise to 
offer a definitive opinion on the question of enablement, the absence of 
working examples and the apparent need for nonroutine screening in order 
to identify which sequences or panels are suitable for which purposes, 
suggest that the claims may be vulnerable to challenge on enablement 
grounds. Moreover, the breadth of some of the claims appears to exceed the 
scope of enablement under the standards of recent Federal Circuit and Board 
decisions, particularly in light of the absence of empirically-tested working 
examples. Claims directed to sequences that are not set forth in the 
specification also appear to lack an adequate written description as that 
requirement was articulated for DNA sequences by the Federal Circuit in 
Fiers v. Revel. 136 The absence of sequence information supporting these 
claims also makes the scope of the claims indefinite, in violation of the 
statutory requirement that the claims "particularly [point] out and distinctly 
[claim]" the subject matter of the invention.137 Those claims that are limited 
to the sequences that have actually been identified and set forth in the 
specification are not vulnerable to these challenges. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We believe that most of the claims set forth in the NIH patent 
applications probably are not patentable. Although the matter is not entirely 
free from doubt, we believe that it is more likely than not that the Federal 
Circuit would hold all of the claims invalid for lack of utility. The asserted 
utilities that appear most likely to satisfy the "practical utility" standard of 
Brenner v. Manson138 either involve vaguely defined medical or therapeutic 
uses, with no indication in the specification of which sequences will serve 
136 984 F.2d at 1 172, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607. 
137 35 u.s.c. § 1 12 (1994). 
138 383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966). 
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which diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, or else would require further non­
routine experimentation to carry out. Those utilities that are most credibly 
enabled on the face of the specification, such as use of the ESTs as markers 
or probes, are most vulnerable to the challenge that they do not amount to 
practical utility in currently available form. 
The claims that cover sequences and panels of sequences that have 
not been specifically set forth in the applications are vulnerable to challenge 
on a number of further grounds. Particularly significant in light of recent 
caselaw is that they are not supported by an adequate written decision. 
They may also lack an enabling disclosure or be overly broad relative to the 
scope of disclosure. Because they cannot be effectively compared to the 
prior art and do not give clear notice of what they cover, they may be 
challenged as lacking the requisite clarity and definiteness of claim language. 
Moreover, it is impossible to determine whether they satisfy the novelty 
standard. 
We are uncertain on the basis of existing caselaw whether any of the 
sequences satisfy the nonobviousness requirement. Most likely to be 
vulnerable to a rejection for obviousness are those sequences that are similar 
to sequences disclosed in the prior art and were obtained through a method 
that was disclosed or suggested in the prior art. Such sequences might be 
considered prima fade obvious, in which case it would be necessary to show 
that they have surprising properties not shared by the prior art sequences in 
order to establish their patentability. On the other hand, in cases where 
there are no similar sequences in the prior art, recent Federal Circuit 
decisions suggest that this approach improperly conflates the method of 
identifying the sequences with the sequences themselves. Because they are 
most likely to satisfy the requirements of enablement, written description, 
and particularity of claim language, the claims that are most likely to be 
patentable are those that are limited to the actual ESTs disclosed in the 
patent applications. Patent rights that are limited to such claims are unlikely 
to be an effective vehicle for technology transfer, however. The primary 
value of such sequences is in their use as research tools, a use that is unlikely 
to be inhibited by the absence of patent rights. Indeed, the use of ESTs as 
research tools might be more attractive to researchers and institutions who 
are assured that NIH does not and will not claim patent rights to subsequent 
discoveries that might be facilitated by access to the sequences. 
